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I examine whether foreign direct investment increases the productivity of 
manufacturing firms. I test the proposition that local firms benefit from supplying 
multinational firms (spillovers through backward linkages) and by purchasing inputs 
from multinationals (spillovers through forward linkages). The existing literature on 
productivity spillovers has relied on industry-level proxies for spillovers. I identify 
spillovers directly at the firm level. I have conducted field work in the Czech 
manufacturing sector and built a unique data set that enabled me to construct firm-level 
measures of backward and forward linkages. My results provide strong support for the 
existence of productivity spillovers through backward linkages.  
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1.  Introduction 
Many countries offer generous incentive packages to attract foreign direct 
investment (henceforth FDI). These packages include, but are not limited to, tax 
holidays, duty exemptions, job creation grants, and subsidized industrial 
infrastructure. They are costly and viewed as unfair by some observers. What is the 
economic rationale for attracting FDI? Policymakers in both developed and 
developing countries often cite productivity transfer from multinational firms to local 
firms as one of the most important benefits of FDI. “Foreign investment brings in new 
research, technology, and skills: … These advances are often adopted by locally-
owned companies.” (The U.S. Department of State, a press release from March 13, 
2006). This belief propagates in part because of claims of productivity spillovers from 
FDI, such as those of the World Bank (2005, p. 60), which writes that “one of the 
attractions of increasing FDI is that technology and expertise may spill over to local 
suppliers, customers, and competitors.”  
However, despite having important policy implications, it is an open question 
whether productivity spillovers from FDI exist. Researchers have so far lacked firm-
level data about interactions between multinational and local firms that would enable 
them to provide econometric evidence about spillovers between individual firms. 
Instead, they examine linkages between industries (inter-industry linkages) using   2
aggregate, i.e. industry-level proxies for linkages. My aim is to fill this gap in the 
literature. The fundamental proposition of this study is that it is necessary to 
overcome existing data limitations and examine linkages directly at the firm level to 
identify productivity spillovers. I conducted my own field work to collect unique data 
that enable to test directly at the firm level whether foreign direct investment 
increases the productivity of domestic firms. In particular, I examine whether 
manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic benefit from supplying multinationals 
(spillover through backward linkages) and by purchasing inputs from multinationals 
(spillover through forward linkages). 
Main findings can be summarized as follows: My results provide strong support 
for the existence of productivity spillovers through backward linkages in the Czech 
manufacturing sector for 1995-2004. Results are robust across many econometric 
specifications. I do not find any econometric evidence supporting the hypothesis of 
productivity spillovers through forward linkages.  
This paper relates methodologically to the studies of Javorcik (2004), Javorcik 
and Spatareanu (2005), and Blalock and Gertler (2008). These researchers concentrate 
on vertical spillovers through backward and forward linkages.
1 However, all of these 
studies examine inter-industry spillovers whereas I examine spillovers at the firm level.  
Javorcik (2004) examines whether productivity spillovers from FDI take place 
in the Lithuanian manufacturing industry. She asks whether domestic firms increase 
their productivity by supplying to multinational firms. She estimates a production 
function and examines whether domestic establishments selling more to foreign-
owned firms produce more, ceteris paribus. She constructs an industry-level proxy for 
backward linkages, defined as the share of a sector’s output sold to multinational 
                                                 
1 For literature studying horizontal spillovers, see Haddad and Harrison (1993), Aitken and Harrison 
(1999), Djankov and Hoekman (2000), and Keller and Yeaple (2003).    3
firms. She employs input-output tables to measure the shares of output of a particular 
sector that are sold to other sectors. She introduces industry-level controls for forward 
linkages. They are defined analogously to measures for backward linkages as the 
weighted share of output in supplying sectors produced by firms with foreign capital 
participation. She employs input-output matrices to measure the shares of inputs 
purchased by a particular sector from other sectors. The key finding is the existence of 
a positive and significant coefficient on the proxy for backward linkage. 
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) study spillovers through backward linkages in 
the Czech Republic and Romania, using the same methodology as in Javorcik (2004). 
They do not find any evidence for productivity spillovers through backward linkages.  
Blalock and Gertler (2008) study technology transfer from FDI to local suppliers 
in Indonesia. They also employ industry-level measures for backward linkages. They 
find evidence of productivity gains among local firms upstream from foreign entrants.   
 I contribute to the literature in following ways:  
First, unlike the existing literature which studies linkages between industries, I 
examine linkages directly between individual firms. My paper is based on unique data 
from my field work that enabled me to construct and employ firm-level measures for 
backward and forward linkages in my econometric analysis. This is important for the 
following reason: Firm-level measures of backward and forward linkages are 
conceptually correct measures of linkages. Researchers use industry-level proxies for 
linkages due to unavailability of firm-level data. They assume that all firms within an 
industry have the same linkage. In this regard, each industry is taken as one firm. As an 
example, consider backward linkages. Studies that employ industry-level measures for 
backward linkages analyze the impact of a percentage increase in the share of a 
sector’s output sold to multinational firms on a percentage change in the output of each   4
domestic firm in the supplying industry. Industry-level proxies would be suitable 
measures of linkages only if multinationals transfer their skills and expertise to all local 
firms.
2 However, my qualitative evidence does not suggest that multinationals 
distribute their expertise widely. On the contrary, it shows that direct contacts between 
multinationals and their Czech suppliers, and their interactions on a day to day basis 
are crucial for productivity spillovers. Suppliers to multinationals especially benefit 
from their assistance with financing, quality control, and training of employees. They 
also face stringent quality and on-time delivery requirements. Firms that are not 
suppliers to multinationals have very limited opportunity to benefit from their 
presence. Therefore, it is crucial to work with data that enables us to identify specific 
firms that interact with multinationals. However, I also include standard industry-level 
measures for spillovers in my estimations for comparison.  
Second, identification of individual suppliers to multinationals in my data enables 
me to test a “self-selection hypothesis.” The self-selection hypothesis has been well 
established in the literature on “learning by exporting.” Clerides, Lach, and Tybout 
(1998) show that superior productivity performance of exporters stems from self-
selection of ex ante more productive firms into exporting, and they do not find any 
evidence for productivity spillovers through exporting, or learning by exporting. 
Analogously to learning by exporting literature, I hypothesize that a decision to supply 
to multinationals may be endogenous, i.e. a part of the equilibrium. Ex ante more 
productive firms might self-select into supplying to multinationals. However, I do not 
                                                 
2 Also note that even in this very unlikely case, existing measures of linkages are imprecise. The reason 
is that researchers use input-output matrices to construct industry-level proxies for linkages. Input-
output matrices are usually not available for every year. Thus, researchers use the same input-output 
matrices for many years or their linear interpolations. If the structure of the economy changes, their 
industry-level proxies for spillovers become problematic. This is an issue, as productivity spillovers are 
often studied in emerging and transitional countries that are trying to catch up with more developed 
countries. But these are precisely the countries where the economy undergoes sweeping structural 
changes.   5
consider hypotheses of learning by supplying to multinationals and self-selection into 
supplying to multinationals to be mutually exclusive. It is possible that firms need to 
achieve some productivity threshold before they can qualify to supply multinationals 
but once they achieve it and start supplying them they benefit from their interactions 
with multinationals. My qualitative and econometric evidence suggests that in reality 
both effects take place. 
Third, several channels of productivity spillovers have been recognized in the 
literature.
3 For example, firms may learn by exporting as it brings them into contact 
with international best practice. They may also benefit from technology embodied in 
inputs purchased abroad. Existing studies on backward and forward linkages do not 
control for all these potential channels of productivity spillovers. Therefore, they 
results might be biased. In my paper, apart from controlling for backward and forward 
linkages, I simultaneously control for both exports of goods and imports of 
intermediate inputs. 
To test spillovers at the firm level, I conducted labor-intensive field work over 
the course of one year based on in-depth interviews with managers of both Czech-
owned and multinational firms located in the Czech Republic. My survey design and 
questionnaire
4 were specifically tailored to determine whether foreign direct 
investment increases the productivity of Czech firms. Personal discussions with 
managers and employees who were responsible for completing surveys enabled me to 
collect high quality data and provide qualitative evidence about relationships between 
domestic and multinational firms in the Czech Republic for the years 1995-2004.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I contrast my 
firm-level findings with results from studies employing industry-level proxies for 
                                                 
3 For the review, see: Keller, W. (2004) 
4 The questionnaire is available upon request.    6
linkages. In section 3, I briefly review a definition of spillovers and linkages. In 
section 4, I describe the design of my field research. I provide population summary 
statistics and summary statistics of my sample. I test whether there is any response 
bias. In section 5, I present qualitative evidence from surveys about relationships 
between local firms and multinational firms in the Czech Republic. I explain my 
estimation strategy and present my results in section 6.  I test a self-selection 
hypothesis in section 7. I conduct a series of robustness checks in section 8.  Section 9 
contains my conclusions.  All tables and figures are available in the Appendix.  
2.  Industry-level versus Firm-level Findings   
To further illustrate how methodologically important it is to examine spillovers 
directly at the firm level, I contrast my firm-level findings with results from studies 
employing only industry-level proxies for spillovers in the Czech Republic. Table 
below summarizes studies using data for Czech manufacturing firms.  
 
Industry-level versus Firm-level Findings 
 









Spatareanu (2005)  Industry-level 1998-2000  No effect  Not included 
This paper  Industry-level 2000-2002  No effect  No effect 
This paper  Firm-level  1995-2004  Positive effect No effect 
 
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) employing industry-level measures for linkages did 
not find any evidence for productivity spillovers from multinationals to their Czech 
suppliers for 1998-2000. This conclusion is not consistent with my qualitative 
evidence that multinational firms provide assistance to Czech-owned firms. 
Moreover, macroeconomic characteristics of the Czech Republic make it a 
particularly likely candidate for productivity spillovers. It has a  long industrial   7
tradition and high endowment of skilled labor. From 1990, the Czech Republic has 
been trying to catch-up to more developed countries. It has a highly open economy 
that received the highest inflow of FDI per capita out of all transitional Eastern 
European countries during the 1990s. Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the Appendix present, 
respectively, FDI inflows in manufacturing between 1993 and 2004 and the territorial 
structure of the stock of FDI as of December 31, 2004. One of possible reasons why 
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) might not find any evidence for spillovers is that they 
work with data for 1998-2000. Figure 1 in the Appendix reveals that there was a surge 
in FDI inflow to the Czech Republic in 1998 and 1999. If it takes more time before 
spillovers through linkage manifest themselves, one should focus on the period after 
1999. To check whether a focus on the later time period leads to a different 
conclusion, I used the existing methodology and tested for spillovers at the industry 
level with data for 2000-2002.  Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) used balance sheet 
data from the commercial database Amadeus. I made use of a panel data set designed 
by the Czech Statistical Office specifically for the purpose of this exercise. It contains 
balance sheet information on all manufacturing firms (NACE 15 – 36) above 100 
employees and on a sample of firms with less than 100 employees from 2000 to 2002. 
However, despite using different dataset and focusing on later time period, I did not 
find any evidence in favor of spillovers through backward linkages at the aggregate 
level either.
5 These results sharply contrast with findings of this study. Here, using 
conceptually correct, i.e. firm-level measures of linkages, I find econometric evidence 
consistent with productivity spillovers from multinationals to their local suppliers. It 
shows that observation of a neutral or even a negative spillover effect at the aggregate 
level does not preclude the possibility of a positive impact at a more detailed level. 
                                                 
5 Results are available upon request.  I included also measures of forward linkages but they did not 
have any effect either.   8
3.  Definition of Spillovers and Linkages 
I use the term “spillover” as defined by Javorcik (2004, p. 607): “Spillovers 
from FDI take place when the entry or presence of multinational corporations 
increases the productivity of domestic firms in a host country and the multinationals 
do not fully internalize the value of these benefits.”  
Backward linkages are understood as contacts between multinational firms and 
their local suppliers. They are a potential channel for productivity spillovers. 
Productivity spillovers through backward linkages may take place through, for 
example, direct knowledge transfer from multinational firms to their local suppliers. 
Multinational firms have an incentive to provide assistance to their suppliers to ensure 
high quality and on-time delivery of their production inputs. I collected qualitative 
evidence (see section 5.1) showing that multinational firms indeed provide assistance 
to their suppliers. It is also possible that multinational buyers have higher 
requirements for product quality and on-time delivery compared to local firms, which 
might stimulate their local suppliers to improve their production process. According 
to my qualitative evidence, local suppliers who consider their multinational customers 
to be more demanding than Czech buyers mention in particular multinationals’ higher 
quality requirements (see section 7).   
Forward linkages are defined as contacts between multinationals and their local 
downstream consumers.  Productivity spillovers through forward linkages may take 
place through gaining access to new, higher quality or less costly intermediate inputs 
produced by multinationals in upstream sectors. I collected qualitative evidence (see 
section 5.2) showing that this might be the case. Inputs purchased from multinationals 
may also be accompanied by the provision of complementary services that were not 
previously available and that may increase the productivity of local firms.    9
4.  Data and Field Work  
 My own field work research was necessary to get any information about 
relationships between multinational and Czech-owned firms in the Czech Republic.  
In this section, I first define which firms are subjects of my research. Second, I 
describe how I conducted my field work research.  Third, I discuss the characteristics 
of the sample I obtained from my field work.   
4.1 Population of Firms 
There were too many manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic for me to study 
the whole manufacturing sector
6, so I focused on firms in four selected NACE
7 
sectors: 21 - Pulp, paper, and paper products; 29 - Machinery and equipment; 31 - 
Electrical equipment and apparatus; and 34 - Motor vehicles. I chose these industries 
because they represent Czech manufacturing well in the sense that they have a long 
tradition and a wide presence in the area.  
Within these four sectors I concentrated on firms that had at least one hundred 
employees on December 31, 2004. There are several reasons for focusing on 
relatively large firms. Bigger firms have reporting requirements to the Czech 
Statistical Office by operation of law and therefore are used to reporting financial 
data. Smaller firms are often family businesses that consider their financial data 
confidential. Small firms also do not have a large enough administrative labor force to 
be able to cooperate on comprehensive surveys. Small firms are also less relevant to 
my research since they are less likely to interact with multinational firms.   
For the manufacturing firms in NACE sectors 21, 29, 31 and 34 that had at least 
100 employees on December 31, 2004, I obtained the following information from the 
                                                 
6 There were 9163 manufacturing firms (NACE sectors 15-36) with at least 20 employees on December 
31, 2003, according to the Business Registrar of the Czech Statistical Office.  
7 NACE denotes General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities in the European 
Communities, (Nomenclature générale des activités économiques dans les Communautés européennes).    10
Business Register of the Czech Statistical Office: a) name of the company, b) to 
which NACE sector it belongs and c) the form of ownership of the company. The 
Czech Statistical Office (CZSO) distinguishes between three forms of ownership: 
Czech-owned, international, and foreign firms.  The ownership is classified as 
“Czech-owned” if the share of foreign capital in the firm’s equity is zero, as 
“International” if a firm is owned by both domestic and foreign capital, and as 
“Foreign” if a firm is owned only by foreign capital. According to the CZSO, there 
were a total of 691 firms in the four industries of interest that had at least one hundred 
employees on December 31, 2004. However some of these firms were not relevant for 
my study. I excluded 20 firms either because they were cooperatives which employed 
primarily handicapped workers or because they were state military companies. These 
firms are not governed by standard market conditions. I ended up with 671 firms. 
These firms form the population of firms for my research. Table 1 in the Appendix 
presents detailed information about the number of firms in the population, divided 
according to industry and form of ownership.  
4.2 Design of Field Work 
For my analysis I needed to collect firm-level panel data. For this purpose I 
constructed a questionnaire and in December 2004 I visited a couple of firms to test 
its design. I started full-fledge field work research in January 2005 and finished it in 
December 2005. I determined which firms to contact as follows. I assigned a random 
number from a uniform distribution to each of the 671 firms in the population. I 
assigned random numbers to firms in each of the four industries studied separately. I 
sorted the firms in each industry according to increasing assigned number. I contacted 
the firms in each industry using these randomized lists. My budget constraint allowed 
me to contact 44 percent of the firms in the population.       11
Due to the complexity of data that I asked for, I did not mail any surveys to the 
sampled firms. Instead I set up appointments with CEOs over the phone first and then 
each firm was visited personally. The survey had two parts. The first part of the 
questionnaire was filled in mostly during interviews with CEOs in the firms. Its aim 
was to provide qualitative evidence about relationships between local and 
multinational firms in the Czech Republic. Qualitative evidence based on this part of 
the survey is presented in Section 5.  
The second part of the questionnaire contained questions regarding financial 
data. I asked firms to provide information for the period 1995-2004.
8 I collected 
balance sheet data, data on exports and material imports. In order to be able to 
construct a control for backward linkages in my econometric analysis, I collected 
information on the structure of the firms’ consumers. I know whether in each given 
year a firm had any multinational consumers. If the firm had a multinational consumer 
I know its percentage share in the firm’s sales of its own products. I also have 
information about the share of foreign ownership in the firm of the multinational 
consumer. In order to be able to model forward linkages, I collected analogical 
information about each firm’s suppliers of material inputs. I know whether in a given 
year a firm had any multinational material suppliers. If the firm had a multinational 
supplier I know about its percentage share in the firm’s material consumption. I also 
have information about the share of foreign ownership in the firm of multinational 
supplier.  
                                                 
8 I did not collect data prior to 1995 because the first five years after the Velvet Revolution, which took 
place in November 1989, were full of turbulent changes: state firms were being privatized, firms were 
realigning into new entities or going bankrupt, and there were not many multinational firms in the 
Czech Republic until 1995. 2004 was the last year for which data was available when I started my data 
collection.  
   12
4.3 Testing for Response Bias 
  In any analysis based on surveys there is a possibility of response bias. During 
my field work I encountered firms that did not wish to participate in my research 
when I contacted them and firms that allowed me to visit their firms and interview 
them but did not return completed surveys. Table 2 in the Appendix provides a 
detailed summary of the firms contacted.  I contacted 295 firms, which amounts to 44 
percent of the firm population. 37 firms, which amounts to 12.6 percent of the firms 
contacted, refused to be visited and interviewed. 258 firms (38.5 percent of the 
population) were personally visited and interviewed. Out of 258 visited firms, 155 
firms either never sent back the second part of the surveys or filled it out 
incompletely. These firms amount to 52.5% of all firms contacted. The major reason 
firms mentioned for not completing the survey was its complexity. Although firms 
know who their multinational consumers and suppliers are, they often do not have 
readily available information about shares of multinationals in their sales or in 
material consumption. It is demanding to extract this data from their information 
systems, especially data for several years back. 103 firms returned the second part of 
the survey filled out in such a way that I could use it in my econometric analysis. 
These firms amount to 34.9 percent of the firms contacted and 15.35 percent of the 
population.  
  Are firms that provided data systematically different from those that did not 
provide data? I was able to compile data about sales, tangible assets, and profits for 
129 of the firms that declined to be interviewed or did not return filled surveys. This 
data is available for various years between 1995 and 2003, and it comes from Data 
Monitor database from the year 2003.   Firms that did not provide data have higher 
mean sales and stocks of tangible assets and smaller mean profits. However, a t-test   13
shows that there is no statistically significant difference in mean sales, mean stocks of 
tangible assets, and mean profits between firms in my sample and firms that did not 
provide data. Testing statistics are presented in Table 3 in the Appendix. Although I 
cannot conclude that there is no bias on the basis of three characteristics, these test 
statistics give me at least some evidence that the presence of a bias is less likely. 
4.4   Sample Summary Statistics 
I obtained data for 103 firms and they form an unbalanced panel data set. I have 
minimally 3 years of data for each firm, maximally 10 years and on average 6.9 years. 
Table 4 in the Appendix provides precise information about the number of firms in 
my sample in each sector and their shares in the relevant population.   
  Table 5 in the Appendix contains information about the numbers of firms in my 
sample divided both according to industry and owner nationality. I distinguish Czech-
owned firms from multinationals. I define Czech-owned firms as firms that do not 
have any foreign capital in their equities. Figure 3 in the Appendix shows the precise 
distribution of foreign share in the firms in my sample. A histogram reveals that the 
majority of firms have either zero foreign share in their equity or more than 50 
percent. Therefore my classification of firms as Czech-owned and multinational is not 
very sensitive to the arbitrary choice of the size of share of foreign capital in the 
firm’s equity. If I classify type of ownership as of December 31, 2004, my sample 
contains 58 Czech-owned firms and 45 multinational firms. I collected data for 18.2 
percent of the population of Czech-owned firms and 12.8 percent of the population of 
multinationals.  
  Table 6 in the Appendix contains detailed summary statistics for Czech-owned 
and multinational firms.   14
5.   Qualitative Evidence from the Questionnaire 
  A sample of 44 multinationals and 90 Czech-owned firms provided answers. 
These questions were answered by general managers during interviews in the firms.  
5.1 Do Multinationals Provide Assistance to Their Suppliers? 
  I asked firms whether they had provided any assistance to their supplier(s) so 
that I could provide qualitative evidence about productivity spillovers through 
backward linkages. 75 percent of multinational firms claimed that they had helped 
their suppliers. When asked what kind of assistance they had provided, multinationals 
mentioned in particular (see Figure 4 in the Appendix):
9  help with financing (e.g. 
advanced payments) in 50 percent of cases, quality control (30%), and improvement 
of production technology (20%). The other most frequent forms of assistance 
included: help with storage of material (14%), machinery maintenance (11%), and 
finding new customers (9%). 7 percent of multinationals also provided employee 
training to their suppliers. Other forms of assistance named were suggestions about 
the production of new products, help with the development of new material and its 
production technology, and the possibility of testing new technologies.  
    I asked Czech-owned firms about their experience with their multinational 
consumers located within the Czech Republic. 48 percent of Czech-owned firms that 
have at least one multinational consumer indicate that they have received help. When 
asked what kind of help they have received, Czech firms report in particular (see 
Figure 5 in the Appendix): help with financing (49%), quality control (43%), 
employee training (34%), and technology improvement (26%).  
  Figure 6 in the Appendix summarizes perceived influence of the entry of 
multinational firms into the Czech Republic on respondents’ firms.  
                                                 
9 These percentages do not add up to 100% as firms received multiple forms of assistance.   15
5.2 Inputs of Production – Sourcing Patterns 
  I asked firms whether and, if so, why they buy material inputs from 
multinational firms located in the Czech Republic to provide qualitative evidence 
about productivity spillovers through forward linkages. 78 percent of firms reported 
that they bought inputs from multinationals located in the Czech Republic. What are 
their reasons?  In most cases (see Figure 7 in the Appendix)
10 Czech-owned firms do 
not produce the needed inputs (56%). In 34 percent of cases they buy inputs from 
multinationals because the multinationals’ products are of higher quality, are cheaper 
(23%), or multinationals offer the best quality-price ratio (10%). In 9 percent of cases 
customers require firms to purchase their inputs from specific multinational suppliers.   
  I asked firms whether and, if so, why they import material inputs. 92 percent of 
firms import inputs of production. When asked why they import material, (see Figure 
8 in the Appendix) firms claim: it is not available in the Czech Republic (83%), 
imported material is cheaper (30%), it is of higher quality (28%), specific material 
from abroad is required by their customers (8%), and imports offer the best quality-
price ratio (4%).  
  To conclude, qualitative evidence shows that multinationals provide assistance 
to their suppliers. There is also some evidence that inputs from multinationals and 
imported material might be of higher quality and can be a source of productivity 
increase.    
6.  Research Strategy and Estimation Results  
 My  identification  strategy follows an approach similar to Javorcik (2004) and 
Blalock and Gertler (forthcoming). I test whether firms that sell more products to 
multinationals produce more, ceteris paribus (spillover through backward linkage) 
                                                 
10 These percentages do not add up to 100% as firms gave multiple reasons for purchasing inputs from 
multinationals.   16
and whether firms that purchase more inputs from multinationals produce more, 
ceteris paribus (spillover through forward linkage). To this purpose, I estimate several 
variants of production functions. I augment the production functions by including 
firm-level controls for backward and forward linkages.   
6.1 Baseline Pooled OLS Estimation 
First, I estimate a production function in the form:  
12 3 4 5 6 7
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where Yit  stands for a real output of firm i at time t. Output is calculated as a sum of 
sales and a change in inventories of the firm’s own products.  It is deflated by a 
producer price index for the proper 2-digit NACE sector obtained from the Czech 
Statistical Office. Mit denotes a real consumption of material. A deflator for material 
was constructed for each sector using a 1999 input-output matrix and producer price 
indices for the relevant 2-digit NACE sectors. Eit is real energy consumption. Energy 
consumption was deflated by a producer price index for energy. I distinguish skilled 
and unskilled workers: U denotes the number of unskilled workers and is measured as 
the number of people in production; S denotes the number of skilled workers and is 
measured as the number of people out of production. Kit stands for real net tangible 
capital at the beginning of the year. Net tangible capital was deflated by a simple 
average of producer price indices for the following 2-digit NACE sectors: machinery 
and equipment, motor vehicles and electrical equipment and apparatus. I use the net 
capital instead of gross capital because it takes into account a vintage of capital. 
 FSit stands for a share of foreign capital in the firm’s equity (Foreign Share). 
The variable attains values from zero to one. Firms that have zero share of foreign   17
capital in their equity are classified as “Czech-owned firms.” I call firms with a 
positive foreign share “multinationals.”     
 Backwardit as a measure of backward linkages is a variable of particular 
interest. It measures the percentage of output sold to multinational firms. The unique 
structure of my data allows me to work with a firm-level measure of backward 











where c=1,….C indexes consumers of firm i, FSc is the share of foreign capital in the 
firm of consumer c, Sc is an own output that firm i sold to consumer c and ST are total 
sales of own goods and services of firm i.  As an example, suppose that firm i had 
three consumers in 2004. If it sold 1/5 of its production to Consumer 1, of which 
100% was owned by foreign capital, 1/20 of its production to Consumer 2, of which 
50% was owned by foreign capital, and 3/4 of its production to Consumer 3, which 
was a Czech-Owned firm, then Backwardit equals 
11 3
1 0.5 0 0.225
52 0 4
     . 
 Forwardit measures that percentage of consumption of material that firm i 











 where  s=1, …S indexes suppliers of material of the firm i,  FSs is a share of foreign 
capital in the firm of supplier s, Ms is a value of consumed material supplied by 
supplier s to the firm i and MT is the firm’s i total consumption of material.  
  t  ,  j   and  r   are fixed effects for years (10), NACE industries (4), and 
regions (14), respectively.    18
  Table 7 in the Appendix contains the pooled OLS results in columns 1 and 3 
for the full sample and the subsample of Czech-owned firms, respectively. 
Coefficients on material, energy, and unskilled and skilled labor have expected 
positive signs in both specifications, and they are also statistically significant at the 
1% level. The coefficient on capital is negative and highly statistically insignificant in 
both specifications. The poor estimate of the capital coefficient is likely caused by the 
nature of the measure of capital used; stock of capital is an accounting entry that does 
not capture well the services of capital used at production. The coefficient on foreign 
share is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that firms with foreign 
capital are more productive than Czech-owned firms. 
  The most important result is that the coefficient on the Backward variable is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both specifications. This 
provides the first indication of the existence of productivity spillovers through 
backward linkages in this study. Its magnitude seems economically meaningful and 
important. A one-percentage-point increase in the backward linkage of a Czech-
owned firm is associated with a 0.772 percent rise in its output.
11 Coefficients on the 
Forward variable are not statistically significant. The coefficient on Forward variable 
even takes a negative sign in the full sample of firms. There is thus no evidence of 
spillovers through forward linkages.  
It is important to note that there is qualitative evidence showing that 
multinational firms are more aggressive in negotiating prices with their suppliers (see 
section 6 for qualitative evidence). CEOs often complained that “multinationals want 
everything for free.” As big players, they have better negotiating positions to enforce 
                                                 
11 See Table 7, column 3 in the Appendix.    19
lower prices for their inputs than smaller Czech-owned firms.
12 I interpret 
productivity gains through backward linkages as an extra value of output a Czech-
owned firm produces by increasing the share of output supplied to multinationals in 
total sales of its own products and services by 1 percentage point, ceteris paribus. The 
“price squeeze effect” goes against the “spillover”. Although Czech-owned suppliers 
to multinationals are being price-squeezed, I can see that the higher the share of 
output sold to multinationals, the more Czech firms produce, ceteris paribus. This 
suggests that I am capturing productivity gain and not simply the price effect. This 
reasoning applies for spillovers through backward linkages in all specifications 
presented in the paper.  
On the other hand, in the case of forward linkages, the price effect goes in the 
same direction as the hypothesized spillover. Multinational suppliers may produce 
more sophisticated products and sell them at higher prices. The Czech-owned firms 
may not be able to make use of the better technology embodied in these inputs but 
they bear the higher costs. This might be a reason why I find positive but insignificant 
and, in several cases, even negative coefficients on the Forward variable.    
  If it takes more time before productivity spillovers manifest themselves, lagged 
rather than contemporaneous measures for backward and forward linkages should be 
included in the model. Therefore I re-estimate the model (1) with one-period lagged 
linkage variables. Results from the full sample of firms and the subsample of Czech-
owned firms are reported in Table 7 in the Appendix, columns 2 and 4, respectively. 
Again, all coefficients of production inputs but capital are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Coefficients on the Backward variable are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in both columns. They are similar in magnitude 
                                                 
12 See Table 6 in the Appendix to compare the size of multinational firms and Czech-owned firms based 
on my sample.   20
to estimates with contemporaneous linkages. Coefficients on the Forward variable are 
not statistically significant.  
  So far, I have worked with the Cobb-Douglas production function. This 
motivates an alternative estimation with a more flexible functional form to test the 
sensitivity of my results to the choice of the form of the production function.  
6.2 Translog Production Function 
  I estimate model in the form:   
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All variables are defined and denoted as before. The translog production function 
controls for input levels and scale effects. Table 7 in the Appendix shows OLS results 
estimated for the full sample and the subsample of Czech-owned firms in columns 5 
and 8, respectively. Owing to space constraints, only the coefficients on linkages and 
the foreign share are reported. Again I get evidence for the existence of productivity 
spillovers through backward linkages and no evidence for forward linkages. A one-
percentage-point increase in the backward linkage of a Czech-owned firm is 
associated with a 0.358 percent rise in output.
13 Although this coefficient is smaller 
compared to the baseline case (0.772), it is still economically significant. This 
indicates that previous results were not driven by the use of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function. 
  So far I have ignored the fact that there might be unobserved firm 
characteristics that influence firm productivity. Such characteristics may include, but 
                                                 
13 See Table 7, column 8 in the Appendix.   21
are not limited to, talented or, on the other hand, poor managers, advantageous 
geographical location, and access to better infrastructure. If this is the case, the OLS 
results are inconsistent. In the next section I make use of a panel structure of my data 
to account for fixed firm-specific unobserved factors.  
6.3 Fixed Effects Estimator and Model in the First Differences 
  To account for a fixed firm-specific heterogeneity, I apply a within estimator 
first. I estimate model (3) using the fixed effects estimator (FE): 
12 3 4 5
67 8
(3)  ln ln ln
                   ln ln ln .
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it it it t i it
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where  i   denotes the firm-specific effect. In Table 7 in the Appendix, results of the 
fixed effects estimator for the full sample and the subsample of Czech-owned firms 
are presented in columns 6 and 9, respectively. I find a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on the Backward variable in both cases. The magnitude of the 
effect is economically meaningful. A one-percentage-point increase in the backward 
linkage of a Czech-owned firm is associated with a 0.356 percent rise in its output.
14 
The coefficients on the Forward variable are positive but not statistically significant at 
standard levels.  
Alternatively to fixed effects, I remove fixed firm-specific unobservable 
variation by estimating model (1) in the first differences. In addition to removing any 
fixed firm-specific unobservable variation, differencing will remove fixed regional 
and industrial effects.
15 Since spillovers through linkages are likely to influence 
productivity with a time lag, I include one-period lagged differences of linkage 
variables. 
                                                 
14 See Table 7, column 9 in the Appendix.  
15 When there are more than two periods, the choice between first differencing and fixed effects hinges 
on the assumption about the idiosyncratic errors. In particular, the FE estimator is more efficient if the 
idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated, while the first difference estimator is more efficient when 
the idiosyncratic errors follow a random walk. See Wooldridge, M.J. (2002, p. 284) for more details.
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 The model in the first differences is specified as: 
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  Table 7 in the Appendix contains results from the model in the first differences 
with the one-period lagged differences in linkage variables for the full sample of firms 
and for the subsample of Czech-owned firms in columns 7 and 10, respectively. 
Again, I find evidence of spillovers through backward linkages and no evidence of 
spillovers through forward linkages.    
  At least as early as Marschak and Andrews (1944), researchers have been 
concerned about possible correlation between input levels and the unobserved firm-
specific productivity shocks when estimating production function parameters. 
Ignoring the potential endogeneity may lead to biased parameter estimates. In the next 
section I take the possible endogeneity of input choices into account by applying the 
system GMM estimator. 
6.4 System GMM   
The OLS method is not appropriate for estimating coefficients of production 
function if inputs cannot be treated as exogenous. If a firm chooses its inputs of 
production based on its productivity, which is observed by the firm but not by the 
econometrician, the inputs are endogenous and OLS estimates will be biased.
16   
In this section I consider a model in the form: 
12 3 4 5 6 7
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I regard all right-hand side variables to be endogenous. I use the system GMM 
estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998, 1999) to estimate the model (5). The system 
GMM estimator is based on two sets of moment conditions. The first set of the 
                                                 
16 See Griliches and Mairesse (1995).   23
moment conditions comes from the first differenced equations (to remove the firm-
specific effect) with lagged levels of the variables as instruments (c.f. Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). A problem with the original Arellano-Bond estimator is that lagged 
levels are often poor instruments for first differences. Arellano and Bover (1995) 
described how, if the original equations in levels were added to the system, additional 
moment conditions could be used to increase efficiency. These additional moment 
conditions are based on the level equations with lagged differences of the variable as 
instruments.
17  
  I assume that there is no serial dependence in εit, i.e. for all i, E[εit*εis]=0 for s≠t. 
I assume that all right-hand side variables are endogenous, i.e. E[xit*εis]≠0 for s≤t but 
E[xit*εis]=0 for all s>t. I use following instruments: for the first-difference equations, 
lagged levels dated t-2 and earlier of the endogenous variables are used as 
instruments, and, for the levels equations, first-differences of endogenous variables 
dated t-1 are used as instruments. 
Results estimated for the subsample of Czech-owned firms are presented in 
Table 7 in the Appendix in column 11.
18 The Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions confirms that instruments are jointly exogenous. I also present the 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in the first differences. Estimated differenced residuals, 
∆εit, do not exhibit second-order serial dependence, which is important for the validity 
of my identification assumption of no serial dependence of εit. The coefficients on 
Backward and Forward linkages are positive. However, only the coefficient on 
Backward linkage is statistically significant (p-value=0.08). A one-percentage-point 
                                                 
17 Blundell and Bond (1998, 1999) precisely characterized the necessary assumptions for this 
augmented estimator and tested it with Monte Carlo simulations. The main assumption is that 
 E[ i  *∆ it  ]=0, which means that the unobserved firm-specific effects are not correlated with changes 
in the error term. 
18 I employed the xtabond2 command in Stata with a collapse option, see: Roodman, D. (2005).     24
increase in the backward linkage of a Czech-owned firm leads to a 0.658 percent rise 
in its output.
19 This provides further evidence that Czech-owned firms benefit from 
their interactions with their multinational customers. 
Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) proposed alternative 
methods how to deal with the endogeneity of input choices. I use both of them to 
check the robustness of my system GMM results.  
6.5 Levinsohn-Petrin Estimator of Production Function 
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) show how intermediate inputs, such as material and 
energy, can be used to control for correlation between input levels and the unobserved 
productivity shock. Their procedure can be applied both for production functions in 
value-added form and revenue (output) form. Given my relatively limited sample size, 
I estimate the production function in value-added form, as there are fewer coefficients 
to be estimated compared to revenue case. Value-added (VA) is defined as the 
difference between real output and real material and energy consumption. I consider a 
model in the form: 
0 (6)   it s it u it k it b it f it it it va s u k Backward Forward         , 
where  ln , ln , ln   and ln it it it it it it it it va VA s S u U k K    . The error term is assumed to 
have two components:  it  , the transmitted productivity component, and it  , an error 
term that is uncorrelated with input choices. The transmitted productivity 
component it  is a state variable that impacts the firm’s decision rules. It is not 
observed by the econometrician, but it may impact the choice of inputs, which leads 
to the simultaneity problem in production function estimation. I estimate (6) using the 
nonlinear semi-parametric LP procedure on the full sample of firms as follows.  
                                                 
19 See Table 7, column 11 in the Appendix.   25
I assume that demand for the energy  ln it it eE   depends on the firm’s state variables, 
capital kit and it  , i.e.  (, ) it it it it ee k   . LP (2003, Appendix A) showed that under mild 
assumptions about the firm’s production technology, the demand function is 
monotonically increasing in it  and can be thus inverted:  (,) it it it it ke    . A final 
identification restriction concerns the development of productivity. LP (2003) follow 
Olley-Pakes (1996) in assuming that productivity is governed by a first-order Markov 
process: ,1 (| ) it it i t it E      , where  it  is an innovation to productivity  that is 
uncorrelated with kit. The model (6) can be written as:  
(,) it s it u it b it f it it it it it va s u Backward Forward k e         ,     
where  0 (,) (,) it it it k t it it it ke k ke      . I follow Petrin, Levinsohn and Poi (2004) in 
substituting a third-order polynomial approximation in kit and eit in place of 
(,) it it it ke  and estimate coefficients on Skilled and Unskilled labor and Backward and 
Forward linkages by OLS. In the second stage, the coefficient on capital is identified. 
The estimated value for  it   can be calculated as: 
it it s it u it b it f it va s u Backward Forward    
    
        . For any candidate value
*
k  , one 
can compute (up to a scalar constant) a prediction for  it   for all periods 
using
*
it it k it k  

 . These values are used to estimate a consistent non-parametric 
approximation to ,1 (| ) it i t E    . It is given by the predicted values from the 
regression
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 , the sample residual of the production function is 
given as:  
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Standard errors are obtained by bootstrap. Results are presented in Table 8, column 1. 
The coefficient on the Backward variable is positive, and its size (0.475) is 
economically meaningful. 
  In the next section, I use LP technique to take the possible endogeneity of input 
choices into account again. However, instead of augmenting production function with 
proxies for linkages, I construct a measure of total factor productivity first and use it 
as a dependent variable in the basic model.  
6.6 LP Residuals as a Measure of Total Factor Productivity 
Javorcik (2004) studied inter-industry spillovers in Lithuanian manufacturing. 
She estimated the coefficients of production function first, recovered residuals, and 
used them as a measure of total factor productivity (TFP) in the estimation of the 
basic model as a dependent variable. I would like to see whether my results are robust 
with respect to this methodological approach. I estimate a production function on the 
full sample of firms in the form:  0 (7)   it s it u it k it it it va s u k     ,  
using the nonlinear semi-parametric LP procedure. I assume that capital is the only 
state variable over which the firm has control.
20 I also estimate production function 
(7) using the OLS and the fixed effects estimator to check whether LP procedure 
works according to the theoretical prediction of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).  
Estimated coefficients of production function are presented in Table 8, columns 
2-4 in the Appendix. The LP technique seems to work quite well. OLS estimates of 
skilled and unskilled labor exceed the LP estimates, confirming the theoretical results 
                                                 
20 In section 6.7 I drop this assumption and consider decisions to supply to multinationals and to 
purchase inputs from multinationals as additional state variables in the input decision of firms.   27
discussed in Levinsohn-Petrin (2003). The fixed effects estimates do not differ 
substantially from the OLS and the LP estimates regarding capital and unskilled labor. 
In the case of skilled labor, the FE estimate is of lower quality. Likely, there is not 
enough within variation in the number of skilled workers to identify the coefficient 
well.  
The residuals from the LP estimation of the model (7) become a measure of 
total factor productivity: 
it it va va
it TFP e

  . To test the hypotheses of productivity 
spillovers through backward and forward linkages, I estimate a model where the 
logarithm of TFP is a dependent variable in the form: 
12 3 (8)  ln it it it it t it TFP Backward Forward FS        . 
To account for a fixed firm-specific heterogeneity, I estimate (8) using the fixed 
effects estimator. I also apply the random effects estimator and use the Hausman test 
to decide which estimator is more appropriate in my case. Results for the full sample 
and the subsample of Czech-owned firms are presented in Table 8, columns 5-6 and 
7-8, respectively. For both samples the Hausman test suggests that the random effects 
model is more suitable than the fixed effect model.
21 In all four regressions, I find a 
positive and significant coefficient on the Backward variable. A one-percentage-point 
increase in the backward linkage of a Czech-owned firm is associated with a 0.860 
percent rise in its output.
22 I do not find any evidence in favor of spillovers through 
forward linkages. 
  To verify robustness of my FE results, I alternatively remove a fixed firm-
specific heterogeneity by using the first differences. To take into account that the fact 
                                                 
21 Chi-square statistics is positive for both full sample and subsample of Czech-owned firms, however 
in the latter case it is very small (0.47) and Prob>chi-square is 1, which means that the test is weak. 
22 Based on random effects estimate for the subsample of Czech-owned firms, see Table 8, column 8.   28
that spillovers through linkages are likely to influence productivity with a time lag, I 
include one-period lagged differences of linkage variables.  I estimate:  
1, 1 2 , 1 3 (9)   ln . i t it it i t t i t TFP Backward Forward FS                    
Results for the full sample and the subsample of Czech-owned firms are presented in 
Table 8 in the Appendix, in columns 9 and 10, respectively. Results confirm previous 
findings. 
When I estimated the production function in the value-added form (7), I used 
the whole sample of firms due to data limitations. However, it would have been 
optimal to estimate the production function separately for each industry. To test the 
sensitivity of my results to this procedure, I selected the industry for which I had the 
most data, which is machinery and equipment industry, and re-estimated models (7)-
(9). Results lead to the same conclusions and therefore I do not present them. 
  When estimating the production function (7) from which I recovered residuals 
as a measure of TFP, I assumed that capital was the only state variable over which 
firms had control. But firms that receive a positive productivity shock may decide to 
become suppliers to multinationals and/or purchase inputs from multinationals. 
Therefore, in the next section, I extend Olley-Pakes (OP) procedure to take these 
factors into account to correct for potential biases in the estimation of the total factor 
productivity. 
6.7 OP Residuals as a Measure of Total Factor Productivity 
To test the hypotheses of productivity spillovers through backward and forward 
linkages, I re-estimate the model (8):  12 3 ln it it it it t it TFP Backward Forward FS            , 
where I use residuals as a measure of TFP recovered from production function 
estimated using Olley-Pakes (1996) method.  More importantly, I include decisions to 
supply to multinationals and to purchase inputs from multinationals as additional state   29
variables in my OP estimation of a production function to control for unobserved 
productivity shocks that are correlated with the supplier and the purchaser status of a 
firm.  
I extend OP estimator as follows. I consider the production function given in (7): 
  0 it s it s it k it it it va s u k      . In each period the firm has to decide about 
its inputs (skilled and unskilled labor) and investment. Investment (denoted as i) 
determines the capital stock at the beginning of each period:  ,1 (1 ) i t it it kk i     , 
where δ stands for the rate of depreciation. In standard OP model, the investment 
decision depends on the capital stock (k) and on a transmitted productivity component 
(ω). To take into account that suppliers to multinationals and purchasers of inputs 
from multinationals may face to different market and operating conditions when they 
make decisions about investment, I include two dummy variables into investment 
function – bit and fit. The variable b takes the value 1 if the firm is a supplier to 
multinationals and 0 otherwise; the variable f takes the value 1 if the firm is 
purchasing inputs from multinationals and 0 otherwise. Investment Iit is defined as a 
gross investment into tangible assets. It is expressed as a function of the state 
variables and the productivity shock: ln( ) ( , , , ) it it it it it it it Ii i k b f    . Assuming that 
investment is monotonically increasing in productivity shock conditioned on supplier 
and purchaser status, investment function can be inverted. Unobservable productivity 
shock can be expressed as a function of observable investment, capital and supplier 
and purchaser dummies:  (, , , ) it it it it it it hikbf   . By substituting for  it  in the production 
function (7), I obtain: 
  0 (,,,)    (,,,) (,,,) . it s it u it it it it it it it it it it it it k it it it it it it va s u k i b f where k i b f k h k i b f              30
Since the error term  it   is uncorrelated with the inputs, in the first stage, estimation of 
this production function provides unbiased estimates of and  s u   . I use a third-order 
polynomial expansion in iit, kit, bit and fit  to approximate unknown function it  . 
  As in OP (1996), I assume that productivity follows a first order Markov 
process:  ,1 (| ) it it i t it E      , where  is the innovation term in productivity. In the 
second stage, I identify the coefficient on capital by a nonlinear least squares 
estimation on:  ,1 ,1 ,1 0 ,1 1 (( ( , , , ) ) it s it u it k it i t i t i t i t i t k i t t va s u k g k i b f k      

          , 
where g is a third-order polynomial in ((,,,) ) it it it it it k it kibf k 

  and the error term   
has two parts: the i.i.d. shock  and the innovation term  in the Markov process.  
  The residuals recovered from model (7) become a measure of total factor 
productivity:  _
it it va va
it TFP OP e

  .  I denote this total factor productivity as TFP_OP to 
distinguish it from TFP obtained using the LP technique in the section 6.6.  
Having acquired a measure of total factor productivity, TFP_OP, I can re-
estimate the model (8) where I use ln _ it TFP OP  as a dependent variable. I apply the 
fixed effects estimator to control for a fix firm-specific unobservable heterogeneity. In 
the Appendix, results for the full sample and the subsample of Czech-owned firms are 
presented in Table 9, columns 1-2, respectively. In both cases, I find positive and 
highly statistically significant coefficients on backward linkages. Coefficients on 
forward linkages are not statistically significant. These findings correspond to results 
from the section 6.6 where the dependent variable, the total factor productivity, was 
obtained using LP method without controlling for the supplier and the purchaser 
status (see Table 8, columns 5-8, in the Appendix).  
I have fewer observations for the total factor productivity obtained using the 
modified OP technique compared to the total factor productivity acquired using LP   31
estimator. The reason is that unlike data about intermediate inputs, I do not have data 
about investment for each firm in my sample. Moreover, the investment proxy cannot 
be used for firms reporting zero investment and thus zero-investment observations are 
truncated from estimation when using the OP technique.
23 Therefore, in the rest of my 
paper I work with the total factor productivity (TFP) obtained using the LP technique 
in the section 6.6.   
So far all the evidence suggests that firms in the Czech Republic benefit from 
supplying to multinationals. However, before I can conclude that this is indeed the 
case, I need to rule out a few alternative explanations. I test the self-selection 
hypothesis in chapter 7. 
7.   Self-Selection Hypothesis (Reverse Causality) 
  If it is more demanding to start to supply multinational firms it is possible that 
ex ante more-productive firms self-select into supplying multinationals and ex ante 
less-productive firms choose to supply Czech-owned firms. Do my previous results 
capture productivity spillovers or are they driven merely by self-selection? Or, do 
these two effects take place simultaneously? 
Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) tested the self-selection hypothesis when 
studying whether firms in Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco were learning by 
exporting. They concluded that (p. 903) “the positive association between exporting 
and efficiency is explained by the self-selection of the more efficient firms into the 
export markets.” In other words, they found that causality flew in the opposite 
direction: instead of exporting causing efficiency gains, the relatively more efficient 
firms self-selected into exporting.  
                                                 
23 This is due to an invertibility of the investment function, the monotonicity condition does not hold 
for zero-investment observations.     32
Melitz (2003) showed in a general equilibrium model that if there are sunk costs 
associated with an entry into export markets, firms with ex ante higher productivity 
self-select into exporting. In my case, it is interesting to look at whether there are 
higher sunk costs associated with becoming a supplier to a multinational firm 
compared to a Czech-owned firm. During my field work I collected qualitative 
evidence that indicates that self-selection into supplying to multinationals might take 
place. When asked whether it is more demanding to start to supply multinationals 
compared to Czech-owned firms, almost a half of the firms (47 percent) claimed that 
it is more difficult. When the firms that claimed it was more difficult were asked why, 
they mentioned pressure for high quality (57%) and low prices (25%). Several 
managers claimed that “multinationals want everything for free.” Managers also noted 
that multinationals set strict delivery terms (14%) and require demanding initial audits 
(13%). Among other reasons firms included the existence of various artificial barriers 
(certifications), a need for frequent visits to foreign headquarters, a higher labor cost 
induced by a need to have more skilled employees, requirements for reducing costs, 
and, lastly, some firms claimed that “multinationals behave as if they were superior 
and could dictate conditions to Czech-owned firms.” Figure 9 in the Appendix 
summarizes these reasons. Also 70 percent of suppliers to multinationals say they 
needed an ISO certification to be eligible to supply them. I propose two ways to 
address the issue of self-selection: restriction of the sample to suppliers to 
multinationals and the use of a dynamic panel model.  
  7.1 Restriction of Sample - Suppliers to Multinationals 
  First I would like to see whether my results are robust to restricting my 
estimation sample to only Czech-owned firms that were suppliers to multinational 
firms located in the Czech Republic for the whole period for which I have them in my   33
database. The restriction of the sample only to the firms that were able to overcome a 
productivity threshold and became suppliers to multinationals should mitigate the 
effect of self-selection. The idea is that even ex ante more productive firms that self-
select into supplying to multinationals may benefit from their interactions with 
multinationals once they start supplying them. If I can still find that the more these 
firms supply to multinationals, the higher TFP they achieve, ceteris paribus, I bring 
evidence in favor of productivity spillovers.   
  I re-estimate the model (8)
24 using the fixed and the random effects on the 
subsample of Czech-owned suppliers to multinational firms. As a measure of total 
factor productivity I use TFP, i.e. the measure obtained in the section 6.6 using LP 
estimator to maximize the number of observations.
25 Results are presented in Table 9, 
columns 3-4, in the Appendix. Estimates confirm previous findings. They are 
economically meaningful and similar in magnitude to results estimated using the 
unrestricted sample of all Czech-owned firms (see Table 8, columns 7 and 8).  
  
7.2 Dynamic Panel Model 
  In this section I try to disentangle the potential effect of self-selection of ex ante 
more-productive firms into supplying to multinationals from the effect of productivity 
spillovers from multinationals to local firms by considering a model in the form:    
01 , 12 , 13 , 1 (10)  ln ln i t it it it t i i t TFP TFP Backward Forward             . 
I include one-period lagged TFP as a regressor to capture the persistence in total 
factor productivity. I include proxies for backward and forward linkages to test 
whether firms improve their productivity by supplying to multinationals and by 
                                                 
24 See page 28. 
25 An estimation with TFP_OP measure obtained in the section 6.7 using the modified Olley-Pakes 
technique leads to the same conclusions.    34
purchasing inputs from multinationals. Linkage variables are included with a one-
period lag to reduce the simultaneity problems. Time dummies are included and 
denoted as αt. If there are no productivity spillovers and firms merely self-select into 
supplying to multinationals based on their ex ante productivity, the coefficient α1 
should be positive and significant and coefficients α2 and α3 insignificant. Based on 
my qualitative evidence, I expect that in reality both effects simultaneously take place. 
I use the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998, 1999) 
to estimate model (10). I assume that there is no serial dependence in εit, i.e. for all i, 
 0   is it E    for s≠t. I assume that regressors are endogenous, specifically 
 0   is it Backward E   for s≤t but    0   is it Backward E   for all s>t, 
 0   is it Forward E   for s≤t but    0   is it Forward E   for all s>t and analogously 
for lnTFP. In the first-difference equations, I instrument for 
,1 ,1 ln ,  it it TFP Backward   and  ,1 it Forward   with the second and higher lags of 
variables in levels, i.e. with  ,2 ln , it TFP    ,2 it Backward  , ,2 it Forward  and their higher lags. 
In the levels equations, I instrument for  ,1 ,1 ln ,  it it TFP Backward   and  ,1 it Forward  with 
the first differences dated t-1, i.e. with  ,1 ,1 ln ,  it it TFP Backward    and ,1 it Forward   . 
Year dummies αt are included in the model. They are considered exogenous and are 
also used as additional instruments. 
  Robust, one-step GMM results for the full sample and the subsample of Czech-
owned firms are presented in Table 9 in the Appendix, in columns 7 and 8, 
respectively.
26  In both cases, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions confirms 
that instruments are jointly exogenous. I also present the Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in the first differences. Estimated differenced residuals, ∆εit do not exhibit 
                                                 
26 I employed the xtabond2 command in Stata with a collapse option, see: Roodman, D. (2005).   35
second-order serial dependence, which is important for the validity of my 
identification assumption of no serial dependence of εit. The system GMM results 
demonstrate that a) productivity is persistent over time, b) firms benefit from their 
backward linkages,
27 and c) there is no evidence for productivity spillovers through 
forward linkages. These findings are consistent with productivity spillovers from 
multinationals to their local Czech suppliers. 
Next I consider two other potential channels of productivity spillovers – 
exporting goods and importing intermediate inputs. Ignoring these potential sources 
of spillovers recognized in the literature could cause an omitted variable bias in my 
previous specifications.   
8. Robustness  Checks 
8.1 Export Channel of Productivity Spillovers  
  It has been argued in the literature that access to foreign markets might be a 
source of productivity spillovers. For example, Grossman and Helpman (1991, p. 166) 
wrote: “When local goods are exported, the foreign purchasing agents may suggest 
ways to improve the manufacturing process.” There are many studies testing whether 
firms learn by exporting.
28 In my sample, 98 percent of the firms are exporters. This is 
not surprising given that I concentrate on firms with at least 100 employees and given 
the small internal market of the Czech Republic and its advantageous geographical 
location within the European Union. With information on the value of exports, I 
construct a measure for exporting experience, Real Export Ratio. 
  I define Real Export Ratio as the ratio of real exports to total real output. The 
Czech Statistical Office provides export deflators for nine groups of products. They 
                                                 
27 However note, that the coefficient on the Backward variable is only marginally significant for the 
subsample of Czech-owned firms (p-value=0.105). 
28 See e.g. Bernard and Jensen (1995),  Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) and Blalock and Gertler 
(2004).   36
do not correspond to the NACE sectors. Therefore, I deflate the exports of firms in 
NACE 21: Pulp, paper and paper products and NACE 31: Electrical Equipment and 
apparatus by a deflator for “Various Industrial Products.” I deflate exports of firms in 
NACE 29: Machinery and equipment and NACE 34: Motor vehicles by a deflator for 
“Machines and Means of Transport.” I include Real Export Ratio (RER) as an 
additional control and estimate a model in the form: 
12 3 4 (11)  ln it it it it it t i it TFP Backward Forward FS RER           . 
I use the fixed effects estimator to control for any fixed firm-specific 
unobservable heterogeneity. Results are presented in Table 9 in the Appendix for the 
full sample and the subsample of the Czech-owned firms, columns 10 and 12, 
respectively.  The Backward variable is still positive and significant at 1% in both 
specifications. The coefficients on the Forward variable and the Real Export Ratio are 
not statistically significant.    
To take into account possible simultaneity between the productivity shock and 
regressors, I employ the system GMM estimator by Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) 
again and estimate a model on the subsample of Czech-owned firms in the form:  
1 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 1 (12)  ln ln i t it it it it t i i t TFP TFP Backward Forward RER              . 
I assume that there is no serial dependence in εit, i.e for all i, E[εit*εis]=0 for s≠t. I 
assume that regressors are endogenous, specifically E[Backwardit*εis]≠0 for s≤t but 
E[Backwardit*εis]=0 for all s>t, similarly that E[Forwardit*εis]≠0 for s≤t but 
E[Forwardit*εis]=0 for all s>t, E[RERit*εis]≠0 for s≤t but E[RERit*εis]=0 for all s>t and 
analogously for lnTFP. These two assumptions imply that for the first-difference 
equations, lagged levels dated t-2 and earlier of firm performance, linkages and real 
export ratio can be used as instruments and for the levels equations, first-differences 
of firm performance, linkages and real export ratio dated t-1 can be used. Year   37
dummies are included in the model. They are considered exogenous and also used as 
additional instruments. Results are presented in Table 9, column 9, in the Appendix. 
They confirm previous findings. 
8.2 Import Channel of Productivity Spillovers 
Another potential channel for productivity spillovers acknowledged in the 
literature is import of intermediate inputs.
29 Embodied technology in intermediate 
goods might be a source for spillovers. Especially for Czech-owned firms, imported 
inputs might be important. With firm-level information about the value of imported 
material, I define a Material Import Ratio as the ratio of real imported material to real 
material consumption, defined as:  
Imported Material Imported Material  Material Consumption-Imported Material
Material Import Ratio 





In the denominator of the Material Import Ratio, I separate material purchased in the 
Czech Republic from material imported in order to deflate each o f  t h e m  b y  a n  
appropriate price index. The Czech Statistical Office provides import deflators for 
nine groups of products.  Since I do not have information about exactly which 
material inputs each firm imports, I deflate imported material by an overall import 
deflator. I estimate a model in the form: 
12 3 4 5 (13)  ln it it it it it it t i it TFP Backward Forward FS RER MIR             , 
where MIR stands for Material Import Ratio. Results from the fixed effects estimation 
are presented in Table 9 in the Appendix in columns 11 and 13 for the full sample and 
for the Czech-owned firms, respectively. The coefficients on the Backward variable 
are still positive and statistically significant at 1% level. Results also suggest that 
imports of material are important for productivity of Czech-owned firms.  
                                                 
29 See Keller, W. (2004, p. 765).    38
8.3 Other Robustness Checks 
  I conducted additional robustness checks. To mitigate the potential influence of 
the self-selection, I re-estimated models (11) and (13) on the subsample of Czech-
owned firms that were suppliers to multinationals for the whole period for which I 
have them in my database. Lastly, I re-estimated the key specifications (models 3, 8 
and 13) allowing for AR(1) shocks in disturbances. These additional robustness 
checks confirmed my previous findings. Owing to space constraints, I do not report 
their results. 
9. Conclusions 
I carried out field work in the Czech Republic to collect information about 
relationships between multinationals and Czech-owned firms in paper, machinery, 
electrical, and motor vehicle industries in the period 1995-2004. In contrast to earlier 
literature, which relies on industry-level proxies for backward and forward linkages, I 
construct firm-level measures for them.  
  My results provide strong support for the existence of productivity spillovers 
through backward linkages in the Czech manufacturing sector. I do not find any 
evidence for spillovers through forward linkages. Results are robust with respect to 
many different econometric specifications. They do not seem to be driven by the self-
selection of ex ante more-productive firms into supplying to multinational firms. 
Results are robust to controlling for export and import channels of technology 
spillovers.     
I strongly believe that researchers studying productivity spillovers between 
firms should work with firm-level panel data sets that contain detailed information 
about relationships between firms instead of relying on aggregate industry-level   39
measures. By constructing firm-level measures, my paper improves upon the current 
methodology. 
  To what extent, if at all, countries should provide incentives to foreign investors 
is an important and highly debated policy issue. Incentive packages for investors are 
costly. My findings suggest that multinational investors are a source of productivity 
spillovers through backward linkages to local firms. This provides an argument in 
favor of a policy of attracting foreign direct investment. However, I do not claim that 
the Czech Republic or other countries should provide incentive packages to attract 
foreign direct investors. Productivity spillovers are just one, though very important, 
part of a complex cost-benefit analysis of the provision of incentive packages.     40
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Figure 1 -  the Czech Republic: Inward FDI                   Figure 2 - Territorial Structure of Inward FDI,                 Figure 3 – Histogram of Foreign Share on Equity                   
                   in Manufacturing, 1993 – 2004                                        Stock on December 31, 2004                                                  of Foreign Firms in My Sample  
 
 
Source: Czech National Bank.                                              Source: Czech National Bank.                                               Source: Own computations based on sample data. 
 
 














sectors  Number of Firms  % Share   Number of firms % Share  Number of firms  % Share  Number of firms % Share 
Czech-Owned 21 51.2  196  60.7 71  38.2  31 25.6  319 
International  5  12.2 39 12.1 31 16.7 22 18.2  97 
Foreign  15 36.6 88 27.2 84 45.1 68 56.2  255 
Total 41  100  323  100  186  100  121  100  671 
 
Source: Own computations based on data from the Business Register of the Czech Statistical Office, data as of December 31, 2004.  43
Table 2 – Summary of Firms Contacted  
 
Firm Category  Number of 
Firms 
%  Share if     
[A] = 100% 
% Share if      
   [B] = 100% 
Total number of firms in population [A]  671  100.00  --- 
Total number of firms contacted [B]  295    43.96  100.00 
Contacted firms that refused to be visited and interviewed   37  ---    12.54 
Visited firms that did not return surveys or returned them incomplete  155  ---    52.54 
Total number of complete surveys  103   15.35    34.92 
 
 
Table 3 – Testing Sample Bias:  Ho: difference in mean = 0 
 
Variable 
Firms that Provided  
Data 
Firms that did not 
 Provided Data  Difference  
in Mean  Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff  ≠ 0  Ha: diff > 0 
No. of 
Obs.  Mean  No. of 
Obs.  Mean 
Sales  814  532.00  230  581.37  -49.37  P(T < t)=0.25  P(|T| > |t|)=0.50  P(T > t)=0.75
Profit  789  32.52  664  25.10  7.43  P(T < t)=0.88  P(|T| > |t|)=0.23  P(T > t)=0.12
Tangible 
Assets  802  244.00  666  254.63  -10.67   P(T < t)=0.37 P(|T| > |t|)=0.73  P(T > t)=0.63
 
 
Table 4 - Sample Summary Statistics – Sectoral Classification of Firms  
 
Sector  NACE  Number of Firms in Sample  % Share of Population 
Pulp, paper, and paper products  21  12  29.3 
Machinery and equipment  29  49  15.2 
Electrical equipment and apparatus  31  26  14.0 
Motor vehicles  34  16  13.2 
Overall    103 15.3 
 
 
Table 5 - Sample Summary Statistics – Classification According to Sector and Ownership
30 
   
NACE  Code  Number of Firms in Sample  % Share of Population 
Czech-Owned Multinationals Czech-Owned Multinationals 
21   6    6  28.6  30.0 
29 33 16  16.8  12.6 
31 12 14  16.9  12.2 
34   7    9  22.6  10.0 
Overall 58  45  18.2 12.8 
                                                 
30 Type of ownership classified according to the state on December 31, 2004. 
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Table 6 - Summary Statistics of Sample Data – Czech-Owned and Multinational Firms 
 
In millions of Czech crowns – CZK as long as not otherwise indicated. 
 
                                                                                       Czech-Owned Firms                Multinational Firms 
 
Variable                                                                      Mean              Std. Dev.            Mean             Std. Dev. 
 
Sales 260.018  342.302  983.515  1854.608 
Output 260.755  342.532  987.277  1868.711 
Profit 11.599  30.213  67.944  207.409 
Profitability=Profit/Output in % 4.022  12.125  4.471  10.500 
Total Exports  114.570  213.194  583.583  1704.578 
Number of Skilled Workers  96.321  96.048  138.165  157.677 
Number of Unskilled Workers  208.197  233.583  415.447  596.714 
Wages 45.381  49.381  111.528  166.945 
Average Hourly Wage in US $
31 4.002  1.220  5.169  1.670 
Material 132.347  228.558  554.321  1166.839 
Imported Material  41.523  100.281  227.567  351.636 
Energy 11.061  19.860  19.690  23.387 
Tangible Capital  111.517  176.134  460.912  1227.983 
Intangible Capital  3.046  9.289  8.463  17.681 
Investment in Tangible Capital  16.381  33.078  124.617  497.304 
Investment in Intangible Capital  1.069  3.562  4.274  15.576 
Investment in Intangibles per Worker                            3.457                 12.35                 5.137                13.541   
(in thousands of CZK) 
Stock of Intangible Capital per Worker                         7.965                  21.52               17.895               42.679 
(in thousands of CZK) 
R&D Expenses  3.400  8.941  8.740  21.203 
Backward Linkage in %  14.576  20.505  15.478  21.985 























                                                 


























How Do Multinational Firms Help to Their Suppliers?
Help with Financing Finding New Customers
Storage of Material Machinery Maintenance

























Influence of Entry of Multinationals on Respondents' Firms
Increase in competition Decrease in market share
We headhunt their workers Headhunting our workers
New technologies New marketing techniques


























Forms of Assistance Received from Multinatinal Firms
Help with Financing Finding New Customers
Storage of Material Leasing of Machinery




















Why Do Firms Purchase Material from Multinationals?
Czech firms do not produce it Higher quality
They products are cheaper Designated by customers





















Why Do Firms Import Material?
Not available in Czechia Higher quality
Cheaper Designated by customers


















Why Is It More Demanding to Supply Multinationals?
High demands on quality Pressure on prices
Strict delivery terms Initial audits
Figure 4 – Assistance Provided by Multinationals        Figure 5 – Forms of Assistance Czech-Owned Firms  
                   To Their Suppliers                                                           Received from Their Multinational 




Figure 6 – Perceived Influence of an Entry of    Figure 7 – Reasons for Purchasing Inputs  
                  Multinationals on Respondents’ Firms                           from Multinationals 
  
 
Figure 8 – Reasons for Material Imports                     Figure 9 – In What Regard Are Multinational Firms  
                               More Demanding Buyers?     
   46





                             Full Sample               Czech-Owned                           Full Sample                               Czech-Owned                        Czech-Owned 
 Estimator                             OLS                OLS            OLS           OLS            OLS             FE               1
st ∆           OLS              FE             1
st ∆             System GMM 
 
Column  No.         1  2  3  4         5        6         7         8         9       10      11 
Backward  0.479*** 0.473*** 0.772***  0.793***  0.326*** 0.258*** 0.181*  0.358***  0.356***  0.224**  0.658* 
  (0.090) (0.092) (0.130)  (0.143)  (0.068)  (0.084) (0.104) (0.092) (0.134) (0.108)  (0.376) 
Forward  -0.058 -0.062 0.046 0.010 -0.047  0.024 -0.022  0.052 0.080 -0.034  0.151 
  (0.072) (0.076) (0.093)  (0.105)  (0.048) (0.075)  (0.076) (0.047) (0.082) (0.100)  (0.339) 
 
 
Foreign Share  0.375*** 0.370***      0.158*** -0.002  -0.043         
  (0.037) (0.038)      (0.031)  (0.051)  (0.030)         
ln (Material)  0.282*** 0.266*** 0.274*** 0.266***    0.608***
  0.559***   0.566***  0.512***  0.418*** 
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)    (0.037)  (0.062)   (0.051)  (0.028) (0.116) 
ln (Energy)  0.174*** 0.155*** 0.130*** 0.112***    0.116***  0.192***    0.130**  0.178*** 0.237*** 
 (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.022)    (0.027)  (0.055)    (0.064)       (0.039)  (0.086) 
ln (Unskilled)  0.400*** 0.414*** 0.356*** 0.360***    0.183***  0.136**    0.141**  0.178*** 0.157 
 (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.037)  (0.040)    (0.047)  (0.066)    (0.071)       (0.062)  (0.152) 
ln (Skilled)  0.135*** 0.141*** 0.165*** 0.167*** 
  0.050  -0.017    0.115          -0.011  -0.134 
 (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.026)    (0.041)  (0.064)    (0.073)       (0.058)  (0.188) 
ln (Capital)   -0.036  -0.017  -0.038  -0.022    -0.007  -0.003    0.001          -0.001  0.079 
 (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.031)    (0.019)  (0.019)    (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.075) 
Number of Obs.  712  618  447  384  712  712    512   447  447    317  447 
R-Squared 0.93  0.93  0.90  0.90  0.97  0.89    0.72   0.96   0.86    0.70   
P-value of Hansen test of overidentifying  restrictions                           0.501 
P-value of Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 1




Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
In models 7 and 10, the dependent variable is ∆ ln (Output); in all other models, the dependent variable is ln (Output).  
Within R-Squared reported with fixed (FE) estimates. One-step system GMM results in model 11.  
Only coefficients on linkage variables and the foreign share reported in trans-log models 5 and 8 due to a space constraint.  
Year, industry and regional dummies included in models 1-4, models 5 and 8 include year and industry dummies, models 6, 7, 9 and 10 include year dummies.   47





                            Full Sample                     Full Sample          Full Sample                  Czech-Owned             Full Sample     Czech-Owned 
 Estimator                             LP                   OLS            FE               LP         FE             RE               FE                RE                     1
st ∆                    1
st ∆             
 
Column No.       1  2  3 
 
4        5       6        7        8       9      10 
Backward 0.475*        0.732*** 0.718*** 0.875***  0.860***  0.466***  0.493* 
  (0.283)     (0.165)  (0.144)  (0.229) (0.181)  (0.178)  (0.258) 
Forward 0.078       -0.044  -0.0002  0.068  0.043  -0.127  -0.052 
 (0.192)       (0.138)  (0.116)  (0.150)  (0.131) (0.196)  (0.197) 
 
 
Foreign Share        0.129  0.252***      -0.083   
        (0.129  (0.083)      (0.089)   
ln (Unskilled)  0.446*** 0.570*** 0.562***  0.463***           
  (0.078)  (0.024)  (0.114)  (0.098)           
ln (Skilled)  0.263***  0.253***  0.089  0.218***           
  (0.077)  (0.032)  (0.091)  (0.070)           
ln (Capital)  0.320**  0.171***  0.181***  0.294***           
  (0.128)  (0.021)  (0.038)  (0.106)           
Number of Obs.   709   772    772    772  709  709  444  444  509  314 
R-Squared     ---   0.98    0.41     ---  0.079  0.071  0.074  0.073  0.05  0.07 
Hausman test          8.70    0.47    
Prob>chi
2    for Hausman




Robust standard errors in parenthesis in columns 2-12. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis in column 1.  
Within R-Squared reported with fixed (FE) and random effects (RE) estimates.  
***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Year dummies are included in models in columns 5-10; models in columns 6 and 8 include also industry dummies. 
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Table 9 – Robustness Checks 
 
 
                  Full Sample  Czech-Owned Czech-Owned Suppliers to Multinationals  Full Sample  Czech-Owned         Full Sample       Czech-Owned 
Estimator       FE       FE                    FE      RE     FE     FE                System GMM       FE      FE      FE       FE 
Column  No.        1        2        3       4       5       6       7       8      9       10      11      12       13 
Backward 0.574***  0.654***  0.778*** 0.776*** 0.839*** 0.808*  0.704*  0.726
† 0.753*  0.700*** 0.715*** 0.888*** 0.600*** 
 (0.167)  (0.226)  (0.239)  (0.207)  (0.282) (0.313) (0.365)  (0.447)  (0.453) (0.206) (0.249) (0.259) (0.259) 
Forward 0.057  0.128  -0.071  -0.019 -0.043 -0.167  -0.378  -0.469  -0.372 0.025 -0.138 0.076 -0.097 
 (0.147)  (0.155)  (0.207)  (0.139) (0.203) (0.242) (0.400)  (0.429)  (0.346) (0.140) (0.154) (0.150) (0.186) 
 
 
ln (TFP)             0.446***  0.366*** 0.371***      
           (0.075)  (0.096)  (0.103)      
Foreign Share  0.073               0.155 0.185    
  (0.131)                (0.131) (0.146)    
Real Export Ratio          0.453*  0.319      0.205 0.014 0.007 0.007 -0.243 
         (0.270)  (0.313)     (0.219)  (0.103) (0.120) (0.215) (0.241) 
Material Import Ratio        0.635*        0.148   0.914*** 
          (0.352)       (0.218)   (0.182) 
Number  of  Obs.  630  379  287  287 277 211  603  373  361 680 518 432 326 
R-Squared  0.141 0.097  0.04  0.08 0.09 0.13  ---  --- ---  0.08 0.08 0.07 0.17 
P-value of Hansen test of overid. Restrictions    0.601  0.557  0.690      
P-value of Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 1




Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
Within R-Squared reported with fixed (FE) and random effects (RE) estimates. 
 ***, ** and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
In models 7-9, these are one-step system GMM results. 
† denotes p-value=0.105. 
Year dummies are included in all specifications.  
In models 1-2, the dependent variable is ln (TFP-OP); in models 3-13, the dependent variable is ln (TFP).  
In system GMM specifications - models 7-9, all right-hand side variables are included with a one-period lag.  
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